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Note
LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM: IMPEDIMENTS CREATED BY THE MYTH
OF WESTPHALIA ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
STEPHEN CARLEY
The present international system is broadly thought to consist of nation-states
possessing certain essential characteristics: a fixed population and territory,
formal equality in external relations and, in nearly all cases, unquestioned
domestic authority to conduct its internal affairs in any way it deems fit. That last
characteristic, often viewed by historians, legal actors and diplomats as a central
and indispensable principle of the international system, is the one most commonly
associated with status as a nation-state and, in the language of international law,
is understood as the essence of sovereignty.
With respect to the internal authority of a sovereign nation-state, few concepts
of law in the history of Western or any civilization are viewed in such absolute
terms. While slow, progressive strides have been made in humanitarian and
human rights law, the orthodox core of international law maintains that such
trends are mere outgrowths of the positive and consensual law of sovereign states.
Sovereignty is therefore viewed as a fixed star, around which all other forces in
international law and political affairs must move.
When inquiries are made into the source of international law’s slavish
adherence to internal sovereignty, the inquisitor is invariably referred to the
Treaties of Westphalia of 1648, the ostensible foundation for the orthodox view of
international law. However, as is explored in the work that follows, emerging
historical scholarship and a closer view at the treaties themselves contradict the
orthodox perspective on a number of serious and substantive points.
Despite its dubious historical account, the orthodox view has permanently
influenced the development of international theory and law, particularly as
applied to the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Charter’s travaux preparatoires reveal that the post-World War II Great
Powers utilized the false historical and normative assumptions of the orthodox
Westphalian view to eviscerate meaningful provisions for humanitarian
intervention, a consequence of the myth of Westphalia that can be felt even today.
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LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM: IMPEDIMENTS CREATED BY THE MYTH
OF WESTPHALIA ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
STEPHEN CARLEY∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Progress in the field of human rights has been slow, though it has not
had the virtue of being steady. On the other hand, the world is coming to
the realization that all persons, regardless of origin, ought to be afforded a
certain measure of rights to enable them to live safe, productive and
meaningful lives. Much, but certainly not all, of current international legal
and political discourse focuses on how much liberty and security the
people of the world deserve, and, what is a more comfortable subject for
lawyers, how to provide them with it.
There are many obstacles to this process: political, psychological,
institutional, systemic. One such obstacle is the idea that nation-states still
possess something like “absolute internal sovereignty”; that is, states are
not only equal among themselves but also retain unfettered and total
discretion to determine what occurs within their own borders,1 and as such
no outsiders may interfere in their internal affairs.2 Though stripped of
much of its persuasive force in recent decades, the continuing—and
perplexing—notion of this principle of absolute internal sovereignty is one
of the most prominent obstacles to realizing international human rights.
∗
The College of William & Mary, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate 2009. My thanks go to Professor Laura Dickinson, whose criticism and guidance were
essential to the creation and improvement of this work. Additional thanks go to my parents, who
always encouraged me to pursue my dreams; the tireless staff of the Connecticut Law Review; and to
my fiancée Meghan, whose support has been, and will remain, absolutely essential to all my success.
All errors that remain are mine.
1
Though the concept of sovereignty often refers both to internal sovereignty—the exclusivity of
control by a nation-state over its domestic affairs—and external sovereignty—the same degree of
control over the state’s priorities in foreign affairs—this Note concerns itself only with the former
meaning.
2
Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1685,
1688 (1994–1995); John Alan Cohan, Essay, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L.
907, 908–09 (2006); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 28–29
(1948); Alun A. Preece, The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty, 8 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. ANN.
229, 229–30 (2003). There are, of course, many other obstacles to the uniform and universal
realization and enforcement of human rights norms—many of which overlap. Some such obstacles
include various forms of racism, nationalism, sexism, religious fanaticism, power disparities, lack of
democratic traditions and institutions, lack of education, lack of sustainable development, poverty,
economic exploitation, homophobia and a distrust of peoples of different backgrounds and the
institutional regimes theoretically designed to protect them. I certainly do not flatter myself capable of
presenting a complete list here, nor do I intend to explore any of the foregoing in great detail. Such is
outside the bounds of this Note.
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For instance, the 2007 democratic movement in Burma was left
unsupported by the international community due in part to the
intransigence of this odd and destructive idea.3
The actual sources for this particular normative view of sovereignty
are less than perfectly clear.4 Yet, at least since the middle portion of the
last century, the standard story is that absolute sovereignty has been the
norm since the great European powers signed the Treaties of Westphalia,
covenants which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648.5 According to the
champions of this paradigm, those nations involved in the war and its
resolution, the Peace of Westphalia (“the Peace”), heroically shuffled off
the coil of feudal and papal oppression in favor of entirely autonomous
territories—the blessed “States” with a capital “S”—ruled, at least in
theory, by secular authorities answerable to no one.6 From there, the
standard story goes, the absolute sovereign system spread to the other
European peoples and, eventually, to the remainder of the world.7
This view of sovereignty has become the de facto standard
interpretation of international legal and political history, particularly in
legal scholarship8 and international relations theory, a discipline whose star
3

See infra Part V.
See infra Part III.
5
Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy—Myth or Reality?, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L.
148, 148 (2000) (“In public international law, there may not be a greater orthodoxy than that according
to which the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War in Europe, constitutes a
paradigm shift in the development of our state system. The twin congress then held is deemed the
forum where distinct separate polities became sovereign, that is, enjoying absolute and exclusive
control and power over a relatively well-defined territory.”) (footnote omitted); Cohan, supra note 2, at
914; Gross, supra note 2, at 28; Preece, supra note 2, at 229.
6
See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 312 (3d ed. 1960) (“By the end of the
Thirty Years’ War, sovereignty as supreme power over a certain territory was a political fact, signifying
the victory of the territorial princes over the universal authority of emperor and pope, on the one hand,
and over the particularistic aspirations of the feudal barons, on the other.”); Beaulac, supra note 5, at
148–49; Gross, supra note 2, at 28–29; Preece, supra note 2, at 230.
7
See Richard N. Haass, Dir., Policy Planning Staff, U.S. State Dep’t, Sovereignty: Existing
Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center
for
International
Studies,
Georgetown
University
(Jan.
14,
2003),
http://20012009.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (“[Following the Peace of Westphalia, s]overeignty helped to
stabilize Europe and, over time, the principle spread. For China and Japan, recognition of their
sovereign equality by other states became a symbol of having arrived. Later, the desire for sovereignty
became the motivating force for the decolonization movement that transformed international relations
after World War II.”); Preece, supra note 2, at 234 (“After 1648, the concept of national sovereignty
spread beyond Europe, as relations developed with countries in other continents, and as European and
other countries gained independence by war, rebellion or peaceful legal processes.”) (footnote omitted).
Whether this expansion of absolute sovereignty to nations outside Europe occurred naturally as a result
of the inherent “genius” of the idea or was simply thrust onto colonial peoples by virtue of European
imperial dominance has, to my knowledge, never been fully explored and is, apparently, a matter of the
particular proponent’s degree of historical delusion.
8
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 148–49; Preece, supra note 2, at 230; see also Cohan, supra note 2, at
914 (“Westphalian sovereignty is the type of sovereignty that is the most well-known in academic
discourse.”); Gross, supra note 2, at 26–27 (“It can hardly be denied that the Peace of Westphalia
marked an epoch in the evolution of international law. It undoubtedly promoted the laicization of
international law by divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its
4
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rose concurrently with the standard story of sovereignty. It has become so
pervasive, in fact, that even critics of absolute sovereignty have implicitly
admitted that it represents historical fact, even while they proceed
vigorously to dispute the wisdom of its corollaries.10 Reflecting this longstanding consensus, some legal scholars have taken to calling the accepted
idea of absolute sovereignty, beginning in 1648, the orthodox paradigm or
“Westphalian orthodoxy.”11
Insightful and courageous scholarship by authors such as Stephane
Beaulac, however, has recently called the traditional paradigm into serious
question. Review of the political and religious power structure in Europe
leading up to and following the Thirty Years War indicates, according to
Beaulac’s research and an accompanying close inspection of the treaties’
history, that Westphalian orthodoxy is a gross over-simplification in some
respects and a total misrepresentation of the historical evidence in others.12
The Thirty Years War, and the international treaties that ended it, emerged
out of the patch-work quilt of overlapping authorities and alliances
including feudal lords, pseudo-monarchical princes, the Holy Roman
Emperor and the papacy, all engaged in a host of secular and religious
power struggles in multiple political dimensions, stemming largely from
the divisive pressures of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.13
When the series of armed conflicts drew to a close, the allied parties signed
two treaties setting terms of the Peace: one, the Treaty of Osnabrück
concluded between the Holy Roman Emperor and German princes with the
scope so as to include, on a footing of equality, republican and monarchical states. Indeed these two
by-products of the Peace of 1648 would seem significant enough for students of international law and
relations to regard it as an event of outstanding and lasting value.”). For a discussion on the certainty
of Gross’s view, see infra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
9
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 93, 113 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991) (“The idea of
international right presupposes the separate existence of many independent adjoining states.”). In
making that claim, Kant, viewed as an early advocate of something like modern liberal international
relations theory, notably admits what has become a bedrock assumption for all of realism’s normative
and descriptive claims. It is unfortunate that even liberal international relations theorists, who dispute
many of the basic tenets of realism, implicitly admit that nation-states, through some kind of natural
order, ought to exercise de jure absolute sovereignty or something akin to it.
10
See, e.g., John R. Worth, Note, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty:
Reconsidering the “Un-signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J.
245, 247, 259 (2004) (explaining, in a commentary criticizing the United States for shirking its
international responsibility by “un-signing” the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, that
“in the decades following the Treaty of Westphalia, nation-states were individualistic and thrived on
self-sufficiency”).
11
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 148, 150.
12
See infra Part II.
13
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152–53, 155; Gross, supra note 2, at 28–29; Preece, supra note 2, at
229–30, 232; see also Cohan, supra note 2, at 914 (“The concept [of Westphalian sovereignty] gains its
name from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which dealt with ending the Thirty Years War. The treaty
represented the concession of some power by the emperor, with his claim of holy predominance, to
numerous kings and lords who wished to vigilantly [sic] protect their own feudal powers.”) (footnote
omitted).
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Protestant Queen of Sweden, and two, the Treaty of Münster with the
Catholic King of France.14 In addition to limiting the princes’ ability to
control the religious beliefs and practices of their subjects, the treaties also
restrained the secular governments from discrimination against religious
minorities in the secular sphere.15 In terms of territorial settlements, much
of the power of the Holy Roman Empire (“the Empire”) was retained;
Sweden gained feudal trusteeship of some lands formerly held by the
Empire, and though France’s acquisitions were more complete, at least one
acquired territory held onto its semi-autonomous status.16
Furthermore, as demonstrated in part by Beaulac’s research, the
powers the monarchies actually wielded following the consummation of
the treaties betrays traditional Westphalian orthodoxy. The lands held by
the German princes—supposedly gaining total authority as the
beneficiaries of their newfound status as sovereigns—were granted the
power to form alliances, though any international treaties or agreements
could not be against the interests of the Empire or the treaties themselves,
and the Empire itself retained authority to control legislation, warfare and
taxation.17 Following the Peace, the Empire preserved its legislative and
quasi-judicial body, the Diet, in which Sweden was to sit as representative
of its newly acquired territories, and which was responsible for ensuring
respect for the terms regarding religious liberty.18 The transcendental Holy
Roman Empire’s atrophy of power vis-à-vis the secular principalities had
begun long before the seventeenth century and concluded only in 1806
with Napoleon’s conquest of all of Germany.19 What is more, even in the
case of divided continental regions such as the Italian peninsula and the
German Confederation, something approaching complete internal
sovereignty under a unified government was not achieved until nearly the
end of the nineteenth century.20
The emerging historical evidence, as well as many facts surrounding
the treaties never in doubt, suggest that the treaties’ primary purposes and
effects concerned religious and minor territorial matters, and were not
fundamentally structural. Though if that is the case, why was any
historical account to the contrary not rejected when it was proposed? As I
14

Beaulac, supra note 5, at 162.
Id. at 164–65; Preece, supra note 2, at 230.
16
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 165–66.
17
Id. at 167–68.
18
Id. at 165, 170.
19
Id. at 172–73; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 231 (explaining that the Empire was finally “put
out of its misery” with the Napoleonic conquest in 1806).
20
See Heinhard Steiger, Peace Treaties from Paris to Versailles, in PEACE TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 59, 61 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004) (explaining that for
the small territories in the German Confederation and Italy, because “the widespread aspirations for
unity to become a nation-state were not met, these aspirations continued to influence the political
developments in Europe during the first fifty-five years after the Congress of Vienna, until 1870/71
when both achieved their objective of becoming unified states”).
15
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shall discuss, the particular timing of this revisionist account of
Westphalia’s place in history—including Leo Gross’s famous article, The
Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948—made it particularly palatable to
Western powers seeking to retain their dominance in the world political
and legal order, as well as to Western political and legal theorists searching
for a way to simplify and justify their views on the nature of that order ex
Furthermore, Westphalian orthodoxy neatly—if somewhat
post.21
inaccurately—fit with the values espoused by political philosophers such
as Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius and Bentham and explained the basis for the
powers claimed and exercised by the absolutist monarchies of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the colonial empires that
dominated much of the population of the world well into the twentieth.22
The state-centered world order—with its fictional historical and
conceptual antecedent, Westphalian orthodoxy—and the authority wielded
by the so-called Great Powers faced major challenges with the catastrophes
of the twentieth-century world wars. In response, a new universal
organization, the United Nations, emerged and was profoundly influenced
by a new, human rights-based cosmopolitan ethic, though it certainly was
not immune to the long-standing and powerful influences of the surviving
European empires, the totalitarian Soviet bloc, and the largely democratic
newcomer, the United States.23 A large portion of the character of that new
organization came to reflect, somewhat schizophrenically, the competing
norms of human rights on the one hand, and maintaining pre-World War II
internal sovereignty on the other.24 As will be explored in greater detail,
certain provisions of the UN Charter (“the Charter”) and the organization’s
power structure refer to its commitment to securing and promoting human
rights, while others pledge their commitment to retaining the sanctity of
matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of its member
states.25 The travaux preparatoires of the Charter tell the story of how a
shared but mistaken understanding of internal sovereignty was utilized to
limit the competence of the Security Council’s enforcement powers and to
convert a legally binding international bill of rights into a non-binding
universal declaration.26
Ever since the immediate post-war era, the extent of adherence to
21

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
23
See Preece, supra note 2, at 238 (“It took a yet more destructive war to lead to the
establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The massive violation of the rights of civilians that
occurred in the Second, as opposed to the First, World War sparked a much greater concern with
human rights: hence, the adoption of human rights covenants, beginning with the International
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the spawning of a plethora of international organisations
aimed at enforcing these rights.”).
24
See infra Part IV.
25
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
26
See infra Part IV.
22
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Westphalian orthodoxy has an inverse effect upon the enforcement of
international human rights, particularly with respect to intervention issues,
which meet head-on the sovereignty-human rights conflict.27 In cases
where totalitarian regimes severely curtail the forces of democracy and
individual liberty, this Note will also explore how Westphalian orthodoxy,
among other factors, acts like a braking mechanism on the progressive
expansion of human rights and thereby has a substantial effect upon the
experience of individuals and oppressed societies around the world.28 One
such example from recent headlines is Burma, known also as Myanmar, a
state in Southeast Asia whose ruling military junta brutally repressed the
largest pro-democracy movement in the nation in twenty years.29 As I
shall explore in context, part of the international community’s reluctance to
intervene on behalf of the Burmese people in 2007 and since stems from
the effects of a robust—and misplaced—general belief in the myth of
Westphalia as a cherished norm in international law and political affairs.30
As a matter of structure, Part II of this Note will consider in greater
detail the historical evidence surrounding the Peace of Westphalia and the
treaties it engendered as brought into new light by recent scholarship
challenging the orthodox paradigm.
With reason to believe that
Westphalian orthodoxy is almost entirely an historical fiction, Part III will
explore some likely sources for the fictional account and why it gained the
attraction and following it has. Part IV will review the way in which the
Westphalian myth helped codify great power rule in the international
political and legal order, with particular emphasis upon the UN Charter,
the functioning of the Security Council, and the limitations placed on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Part V then serves to add color to
the present discussion by demonstrating the effects of this attitude toward
global order and the prioritization of the myth of sovereignty over
humanitarian and democratic concerns. Reflections upon the extent of
hindrances created by continued adherence to Westphalian orthodoxy draw
the Note to a close in Part VI.

27
See Cohan, supra note 2, at 915 (“Westphalian sovereignty may be thought of as an absolute
norm of nonintervention.”).
28
See infra Part V.A.
29
Thomas Fuller, Burmese Junta Admits at Least 15 Died in Protests, Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2007, at A5, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing the extent of the junta’s
response to the August-September protests); Seth Mydans, Monks’ Protest Is Challenging Burmese
Junta, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing
actions by Burmese monks as the largest pro-democracy protests in two decades).
30
See infra Part V.B.
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II. HISTORICAL REALITY VERSUS THE MYTH OF WESTPHALIAN
ORTHODOXY
A. Medieval European Political Reality Preliminary to the Thirty Years
War
The standard story told by the proponents—and implicitly accepted by
a great many opponents—of absolute state sovereignty is that the authors
of the Treaties of Westphalia, in a flash of brilliance, rid Europe forever of
the chaos of the petty parochial interests of feudal lords and the universal
religious aspirations of the pope and Holy Roman Emperor, bent on
domination of the entire civitas Christiana.31 Insofar as this standard story
assumes that authority in Europe in the Middle Ages was divided amongst
many different levels, both horizontal and vertical, of political and
religious influence, it is correct, but its accuracy and veracity largely end
there.32 As has been demonstrated by several authors and researchers,
most recently and persuasively by Beaulac, it is clear that the evolution of
European power structures from overlapping hierarchies to a system of
perfectly equal and well-defined sovereign nation-states neither began nor
ended with the Peace of Westphalia, nor did 1648 even signify the end of
influence from transcendental institutions such as the Catholic Church or
the Holy Roman Empire.33
Well before the eruption of hostilities that comprised the Thirty Years
War in 1618, European territories in the Middle Ages—particularly
Germany—were ruled by a hodge-podge of secular and religious
authorities lacking formal ties of unity or any of the marks of modern
31
See Haass, supra note 7 (“In Europe before sovereignty, political authority was shared by
empires, kingdoms, duchies, and city-states. Complicating matters further, there was no clear boundary
separating religious and secular authority. Popes and kings claimed—and fought over—the same
peoples and territories. This patchwork of overlapping authorities proved flammable when the wars of
religion ignited following the Reformation. . . . In response, European rulers came to embrace
sovereignty as a means to maintain a basic level of order, both within individual countries and in
relations between and among them. A pivotal event in this process was the Peace of Westphalia of
1648 . . . . Sovereignty helped to stabilize Europe and . . . has been a source of stability for more than
two centuries.”); see also Preece, supra note 2, at 230, 232 (“The Westphalian doctrine involved the
recognition that, in order to avoid perpetual conflict as a result of religious differences, states must be
allowed to differ on fundamental aspects of their internal organisation. . . . [Before 1648,] interference
in ‘internal’ affairs of territories was easily justified on the basis of some alleged feudal right, or, after
1517, in the name of maintaining the true universal Christian religion against allegedly heretical
reformers.”).
32
See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 150–51 (“[The Peace of Westphalia in] 1648 does not close the
final chapter of the multilayered system of authority in Europe. Rather, it constitutes but one instance
where distinct separate political entities strived for more power through independence, which was only
achieved long after the Peace.”).
33
See Randall Lesaffer, Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia, in PEACE TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY, supra note 20, at 9, 43; Beaulac, supra note 5, at 175–
76. Cf. Preece, supra note 2, at 232 (maintaining that the Westphalian Settlement significantly reduced
the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor).
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34

nationalism. The average European could expect to be the subject of any
number of vassals, feudal lords, secular monarchs or religious nobles under
the authority of the pope and, assuming loyal behavior, the object of a
varied array of rights in land and duties toward his or her family and local
master.35 England was the most centralized and organized monarchy
without ties to Rome, but even France and Spain, insofar as they could be
called nations, actively resisted feudal ties to the pope and the German
Empire.36 In the transcendental sphere, both the emperors and popes
attempted to harness the unifying forces of the Crusades to rule the whole
of Christendom, though the Catholic Church’s efforts were severely
hindered by the Great Schism beginning in 1378 that divided the Catholic
world and nearly doomed the papacy.37
In the century and a half before Westphalia, the forces of the
Reformation did the most to encourage the peoples and princes of Europe
to turn away from the Church and to establish secular governments.38 As
the Empire lost its ties with the same peoples who had largely abandoned
the Catholic Church, those nations—mostly England, France, Spain and
many city-states in northern Italy—were the first to establish autonomous
regions under mostly secular authorities.39 Though the methods these
nations employed in moving toward centralized government were as
diverse as the cultures of their citizens, it is perfectly clear that this process
began well before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and its peaceful
resolution in the middle of the seventeenth century.40
Even among the growing principalities within the Empire itself, local
and regional rulers were granted increasing autonomy to set both secular
34

See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152–53, 155 (explaining the various authorities seeking
dominance in European affairs, particularly between the Catholic Church and Holy Roman Empire and
between those two transcendental institutions and the “countless subordinate civil societies of Europe”
comprised of feudal lords and monarchs); see also G. CLARK, EARLY MODERN EUROPE FROM ABOUT
1450 TO ABOUT 1720, at 28 (London, Oxford University Press 1960) (“Europe was not divided up into
exclusive sovereignties, but was covered by overlapping and constantly shifting lordships.”); Preece,
supra note 2, at 232 (“In pre-1648 Europe, with its lack of a clear definition of national sovereignty, but
rather a patchwork of rambling and competing feudal empires, there was no clear distinction between
internal and external affairs.”).
35
See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (4th ed. 2003)
(describing the conflicting “political, legal, religious, and moral allegiances” faced by Europeans
during this time period); Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152 (describing how heteronomous communities and
principalities overlapped, providing individuals with “different rights and obligations” under the
decentralized feudal structure).
36
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 155, 157–59; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 233–34 (describing the
various efforts of England, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, France and Switzerland to resist the coercive
tactics and religious hegemony of the Catholic Church).
37
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 155.
38
Id. at 155, 159–60.
39
Id. at 157–59.
40
Id. at 159, 161–62; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 233 (“In the century or more prior to 1648,
a limited number of European countries succeeded in establishing the essentials of national sovereignty
by breaking away from allegiance to the Pope.”).
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and religious policy for their subjects in the two centuries leading up to the
Thirty Years War.41 Indeed, the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, negotiated on
equal terms between the German monarchs and the emperor, was the most
prominent move in the direction of local control, formalizing and codifying
the practice of cuius region eius religio, i.e., the religion of the king is the
religion of the kingdom.42 This practice—combined with the increasingly
restrictive laws on religious worship imposed by Emperor Rudolf II—
provoked considerable resentment between Catholics and the growing
Protestant minorities.43
More kindling was added to fuel the eventual conflagration as
Protestant and Catholic factions, both within the Empire and in nearly
every other European nation—England, Denmark, Sweden, the
Netherlands, France, Spain—formed armed coalitions or began arming as a
nation, loosely constructed, in response to minor violent outbursts.44
Beginning at the close of the sixteenth century, and in a manner eerily
reminiscent of the complex network of treaties that accelerated and
amplified the First World War approximately three hundred years later,
those coalitions formed alliances with each other in anticipation of the
other side’s desire to establish religious and political hegemony.45
B. Precipitating Events and Parties to the Thirty Years War
The limited shifts toward greater local control and, for Lutherans living
in ecclesiastical territories, religious tolerance that had been intended by
the parties to the Peace of Augsburg were unable to check adequately the
increasing attitudes of disaffection and malevolence felt by the Catholic
and Protestant populations. Within the territory of the Empire itself, and
especially in Bohemia, the Treaty of Augsburg did little to ensure respect
for the minority’s religious views.46 There, in fact, a devout Catholic,
Ferdinand II, was named as the successor to Emperor Matthias, and
Ferdinand sent two Catholic councilors to Prague in May of 1618 to
manage Bohemian affairs while the emperor took up his new office.47
41
See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 159 (“With respect to secular matters, increasingly substantial
political concessions were gradually granted in favour of the principalities. As regards religious
matters, several powerful German Princes took the Protestant side in the emerging conflicts and they
revolted against the Holy Roman Empire.”) (footnote omitted). Beaulac also describes how religious
authority was given over to the monarchies in a negotiated settlement with the Empire. Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 160.
45
Id.
46
See Arthur MacDonald, Suggestions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia for the Peace
Conference in France, 88 CENT. L.J. 302, 305 (1919) (“The religious peace of Augsburg (1555)
furnished no settlement to questions stirred up by the Reformation.”).
47
See id. at 305, 306 (noting the presence of “two detested representatives of the [German]
Crown” in Prague in May of 1618 and recalling that Ferdinand II, as emperor early in the war, “said he
would rather beg or be cut to pieces than submit to [Protestant] heresy”).
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Protestants, fearing a loss of their power under the new emperor,
stormed the imperial palace, seized the two councilors and threw them out
Known as the
a window nearly seventy feet off the ground.48
Defenestration of Prague, the near-deaths of the new emperor’s councilors
at the hands of the Protestant minority sparked a general revolt in
Bohemia, a conflict which spread between all German religious forces,
waged in part by the armed coalitions of the Protestant Evangelical Union
and the Catholic League.49
The new and comparatively weak Emperor Ferdinand II, facing an
increasingly aggressive Protestant minority, called on his ally Phillip IV,
the Spanish king, for assistance. France, though it was primarily Catholic,
actively opposed the Habsburg-Spanish alliance and joined forces with
Sweden to intervene on behalf of the Protestants; within a decade of the
original religious rebellion in Bohemia, the spreading conflict became
dominated by the political forces of the allied nations against the Empire.50
The battles themselves, primarily fought on German territory, devastated
Europe and nearly all of the regions of the disordered Empire, eliminating
large proportions of the population through famine and disease as well as
destroying vast quantities of property.51
Several powers, including Denmark, Venice, England and the papacy,
failed several times to intervene and mediate a resolution to the conflict.
The conflict extended and its destruction intensified partially because of
the inability of the belligerents to agree on diplomatic procedures
necessary to a multilateral peace settlement.52 Some of the disputed
procedures concerned the attempts to include the German princes as equal
parties to the negotiation, suggesting that there was absolutely no
agreement about whether or in what way the principalities should be
subordinated to the emperor.53 After approximately nine years of
negotiations, concessions finally made by the Empire and the Vatican as
the chief mediating authority, permitted joint negotiated settlements with
48

Beaulac, supra note 5, at 160 n.72.
Id. at 160; see also JANIS, supra note 35, at 161–62 (describing the defenestration as the onset
of the bloody religious wars that were to follow).
50
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 161.
51
MacDonald, supra note 46, at 305, 306.
52
Kenneth Colegrove, Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress of Westphalia, 13 AM.
J. INT’L L. 450, 450 (1919).
53
See id. at 450–51 (“The theoretical or ceremonial equality of states as now recognized in
international law was by no means established [prior to the Peace], and the contest for pre-eminence
among the crowns of Europe embittered national feelings and embarrassed the work of diplomats. The
Holy Roman Empire, whose jurists had so positively claimed for it a universal jurisdiction, was
crumbling into smaller units; princes and estates within the Empire, technically subordinate but
practically independent of the Emperor, added to the diplomatic confusion by their demands for direct
participation in international affairs . . . .”); see also Beaulac, supra note 5, at 163 (noting that the
insistence of Sweden and France to have the German monarchs as parties to both treaties was a
strategy, ultimately successful, to weaken the negotiating position of the emperor).
49
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France in the city of Münster and concurrently with the Queen of Sweden
in the nearby city of Osnabrück. This proved a major political and
diplomatic victory for the Swedes; they had previously been unable to
achieve the respect and recognition accorded to those elite nations on the
extreme end of the European power spectrum, most specifically France and
the Empire itself.54
C. Treaty Terms and Institutional Changes Incident to the Peace
The hostilities came to an end without a decisive victory by either side,
and in the treaties that emerged, the major parties negotiated territorial,
structural and religious terms designed to prevent—or at least to minimize
—future armed inter-conflict. It is clear from the complexity of several of
the treaties’ provisions, particularly those with respect to territorial
exchanges and institutional powers, that a number of methods for dividing
power were on the table; particular provisions allocating authority could
be, and were, traded by the parties in return for concessions elsewhere.
Though on balance Sweden and France won more territorial
acquisitions from the Empire than vice versa, Sweden’s claims to the new
lands under the Treaty of Osnabrück were explicitly limited.55 That is to
say, Sweden’s acquisitions were not complete conveyances but rather new
areas held in trust as “imperial fiefs” and for which the Swedish crown was
to sit as representative in the Diet.56 For France, most of its territorial
gains gave it full title, with the notable exception of Alsatia, which
remained semi-autonomous due to its privileged position in the Empire.57
Though the German monarchs were generally cooperative parties with
the Empire while negotiating bilaterally with France and Sweden in the
two respective treaties, their inclusion in the talks at the insistence of the
latter meant both a weakening of the Empire and some limited
modifications of their legal status. Most significantly, Article 65 of the
Treaty of Münster and Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Osnabrück
granted the principalities the power to conclude alliances with foreign
nations.58 However, these external powers were not to be exercised against
the interests of the Empire, lest they come into conflict with the explicit
terms of the treaties themselves.59 Furthermore, though the treaties
conferred a limited power upon the princes now recognized as “inherent in
sovereignty,” the Empire retained the domestic powers of legislation,
54

Colegrove, supra note 52, at 480–81.
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 165.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 165–66.
58
Id. at 167.
59
Id. Beaulac also argues that, far from transferring a new and exclusive power of external
relations to the secular princes, the treaties more or less codified a custom that had been followed by
the monarchs since the beginning of the seventeenth century. Id. at 168.
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warfare and taxation through its Diet. Although these provisions in the
treaties can fairly be seen as a further deterioration of the Empire’s
political and legal authority, they in no way dissolved the Empire into
distinct national entities. On the contrary—as Beaulac’s research
establishes—the treaties reaffirmed some of the Empire’s historic powers
while recognizing the changing political landscape respecting local
German rulers.
Part of that recognition, in addition to extending a limited power of
external relations to the principalities, also involved an explicit acceptance
of external intervention into the affairs of any party if it failed to abide by
the terms of the treaties. Specifically, Article 123 of the Treaty of Münster
stated “all Partys in this Transaction shall be oblig’d to defend and protect
all and every Article of this Peace against any one, without distinction of
Religion . . . .”61 This term effectively granted the right and, in fact, the
legal duty of any party to the Peace—but, implicitly, France and Sweden in
particular—to come to the aid of any group, including religious minorities
within the Empire, deprived of a right guaranteed to them under the
treaties.62 Far from establishing inviolable national frontiers and entirely
sovereign governments answerable to no external authority, the treaties
established “what may fairly be described as an international constitution,
which gave to all its adherents the right of intervention to enforce its
engagements.”63
Both treaties not only failed to consecrate the idea of absolutely
independent secular authorities, they also placed legal restrictions on the
German princes with respect to exclusive enforcement of any particular
Christian denomination within their territories. Specifically, Article 5 of
the Treaty of Osnabrück held that Catholics and Protestants embracing “a
[r]eligion different from that of the Lord of the[ir] [t]erritory, shall in
consequence of the said Peace be patiently suffered and tolerated” with
respect to private religious practice, liberty of conscience and education.64
Furthermore, the treaty protected those minorities from discriminatory
exclusion from access to merchant guilds, poor houses, hospitals and other
60

Id. at 167–68.
Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France
and
Their
Respective
Allies
art.
123,
October
24,
1648,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp (spelling modernized). In his article from 1948,
Gross noted that the inclusion of this provision in the treaty was not without precedent in European
peace settlements. Gross, supra note 2, at 24.
62
See Gross, supra note 2, at 24 (“These [Westphalian] treaties contain clauses by which Sweden
and France not only make peace with the Emperor on certain terms, but pledge themselves to their
allies, the subordinate German Princes, that they will ensure that the privileges and immunities
conferred on the Princes and free cities of Germany in the treaty shall be upheld and maintained.”
(quoting SIR JAMES HEADLAM-MORELEY, STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 108 (1930))).
63
Gross, supra note 2, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DAVID JAYNE HILL, 2 A
HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE 602 (1925)).
64
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
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institutions available to the majority.
Therefore, as opposed to the
attempts at historical reification that were to follow, the Treaties of
Westphalia contained several ground-breaking legal provisions for
religious pluralism, enforced against domestic authorities in international
law by both a transcendental institution and external governments. A
codification of absolute and exclusive power in the nation-state these
treaties were not.
D. The European System Before and After Westphalia
The traditional story told by proponents of Westphalian orthodoxy is
that the Peace ended, for all intents and purposes, the authority of all
entities above and below the level of the nation-state and left behind a
system of secular governments which ruled autonomous territories without
any outside interference whatsoever. Unfortunately for the proponents,
however, Beaulac’s scholarship strongly suggests that this version of
history simply does not accord with the legal or political realities of the
time.
Were the prevailing view on Westphalia’s effects correct, one would
reasonably expect the Empire to have quickly withered away along with all
other feudal and religious institutions in and among the new independent
states of Europe. Instead, the Empire’s Diet was charged with the
enforcement of the provisions for religious tolerance66 and affirmed in its
traditional legislative powers.67 Beyond the sterile language of the treaties
themselves, the Empire retained considerable practical influence and
strength, though admittedly it did not thrive as it had in centuries past.
Many of the German monarchs remained steadfast in their support of the
emperor, the Diet and the imperial army, and the imperial courts retained
their jurisdiction and functions well into the eighteenth century.68 The
office of the emperor itself faced significant constraints on its power, but
largely not until after 1711; that date saw the final enactment of the
principle of Landeshoheit into imperial law, giving explicit effect to the

65

Id. at 164–65.
See id. at 168–69 (“[T]he Empire remained a key factor according to Westphalia. Indeed, it is
through Imperial institutions—such as the Diet and the Courts—that religious safeguards were imposed
in decision-making process.”). Obviously, as previously noted, this responsibility was also given over
to all parties, particularly France and Sweden, as an explicit legal right of intervention into the internal
affairs of any party for violations of the Peace. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
67
Beaulac, supra note 5, at 167–68, 170. Beaulac suggests that the Diet’s effectiveness as an
exclusive transnational or national legislative body was significantly hindered from 1648 onward, as it
generally required consensus from the Protestants and Catholics on matters of religion, a consensus
seldom obtained. Id. at 171. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, however, that the
Diet lost all or nearly all of its influence. Id. at 171–72.
68
Id. at 170, 172.
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expanding authority of the monarchs vis-à-vis the emperor. Thus, the
compromises of Westphalia did not mean the dissolution of the Empire
into a single or set of independent German nation-states, but rather another
reduction in the Empire’s influence because of an inability to vindicate the
subordination of the Protestants and their allies on the battlefield.
Napoleon’s military campaign at the beginning of the nineteenth
century is also extremely telling. Though the transfer of lands to secular
authorities from ecclesiastical rulers had been underway for hundreds of
years in the Empire, that process was by no means complete by 1803,
when
the
Diet
passed
its
last
major
enactment,
the
Reichsdeputationshaupschuluss.70 That law was the final act of territorial
redistribution, due primarily to French occupation of German lands west of
the Rhine. However, as there was no unity among the German
principalities, Napoleon’s invasion and military conquest was directed
against the last emperor, Francis II, who was instructed to abdicate the
throne for all territories outside Austria.71 Therefore, the ultimate
termination of the transcendental Holy Roman Empire did not come as a
result of Westphalia or even at the behest of the secular German polities,
but rather from an external threat made by imperial France, Europe’s new
hegemonic power.
In addition, institutions of authority other than the nation-state
continued to exert considerable influence in the centuries following the
Peace. The Vatican, though not a politically unifying force as it had been
during the Crusades, had developed and implemented doctrine since the
beginning of the Reformation both to gather new adherents and to retain
those Europeans considering conversion to the multiplicity of Protestant
sects. But despite the internal division of the Reformation and CounterReformation, Rome nevertheless continued to act beyond its limited
territory as a unifying spiritual and cultural bulwark against non-European
powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the papacy’s
willingness to mediate the end of the Thirty Years War betrays the
proposition that the Peace removed it as a player in European affairs.
Thus, any conclusion that the European nations, including prerevolutionary France, did or even could act utterly without regard to the
dictates and preferences of the Vatican would be highly questionable.
After the Congress of Vienna (“the Congress”), many European regions
such as Italy and the German Confederation also lacked clear boundaries
under a unified government, both necessary preconditions for statehood.72
69
Id. at 172. The origins of the limitation of the office of the emperor imposed by the lower
feudal monarchs date back to the Golden Bull, a constitutional provision establishing the rules for
electing the emperor, passed nearly three hundred years before the Peace of Westphalia. Id.
70
Id. at 172–73.
71
Id. at 173 n.148.
72
See Steiger, supra note 20, at 61.
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Thus, it was not only the continued significance of the Holy Roman
Empire long after the Peace, but also the persistence of these non-national
institutions and circumstances which defy the simplistic account portrayed
by Westphalian orthodoxy.
III. HOW THE WESTPHALIAN MYTH BECAME ORTHODOXY
A. Likely Sources for the Orthodox Paradigm
Given that neither the language of the treaties of Westphalia
themselves nor the practical reality of European power in the years
following 1648 suffice to justify the claims of Westphalian orthodoxy, the
natural question can be put plainly: where did scholars and diplomats of
recent memory go astray? Put another way, if the traditional story of
Westphalia—that the chaos of feudal Europe was quickly transformed into
a system of co-equal, independent and absolutist nation-states—has no
basis in legal or historical fact, why is the traditional story so widely
accepted and disseminated?
From a Western philosophical perspective, medieval notions of secular
authority tempered by the dictates of heaven gave way to greater emphasis
on positive law in the period just before, and for centuries after,
Westphalia. The process began with Jean Bodin, who wrote in his 1576
treatise Republique that the person of the sovereign at the head of a
government was the ultimate maker of law and subject to no restriction
except the divine law of God.73 The initial grant of sovereignty to an
earthly prince flowed along hereditary lines established by the Catholic
Church, and all persons under the command of the sovereign were bound
to obey that positive law unless that law contradicted a higher command
from God.74 Bodin went beyond this limiting condition in his later
writings by arguing that, in order for the earthly prince to be an effective
ruler, the power he wielded had to be both “absolute and
unchallengeable.”75
Hugo Grotius, who had been Sweden’s ambassador during the
negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia, also redirected post-Westphalian
views of sovereignty among academics, philosophers and monarchs with
his 1625 work De Jure Belli ac Pacis.76 Drawing on that natural law
tradition of sixteenth-century Spanish theologians, and writing partially in
response to the brutal excesses of the Thirty Years War, Grotius
73
Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 372 (2005).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 372–73 (citing JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY
23 (1973)).
76
That is, The Law of War and Peace.
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emphasized that the law of nations both regulated the conduct of war itself
and the voluntary, reciprocal interactions between sovereign states.77 As
one of the representatives at Westphalia, Grotius did not claim that rulers
had unfettered discretion to violate natural law. Taking just the opposite
view, Grotius stated:
Least of all should that be admitted which some people
imagine, that in war all laws are in abeyance. On the
contrary, war ought not to be undertaken except for the
enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be
carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith.78
Instead, Grotius’ contribution to the philosophical swing toward
positivism involved the diminished roles the Empire and the Vatican
played in his theory of international law and peace. That is to say, Grotius
argued that both natural and divine law demanded that rulers were bound
not just to make but also to respect in good faith mutual promises of peace
and cooperation as members of the society of nations.79 As those
obligations were applicable directly to the sovereign nations who made
them, the previous tasks of the emperor and pope as instruments of
moderation were concomitantly restricted.80 Under his theory, then,
Grotius made it incumbent on states to police themselves by following a
“positive law of nations grounded on moral notions of covenant.”81
While Grotius had moved international commitments from the realm
of transcendental institutions to a more positive law of nations, the most
influential personality on the topic of sovereignty addressed the scope and
applicability of domestic positive law. Thomas Hobbes, who wrote The
Leviathan shortly after the Peace of Westphalia and while in exile in
France, focused a great deal of his attention to describing the most
appropriate characteristics of sovereign governments.82 For him, the
philosophical ideal demanded that any authority claiming the status as a
sovereign had to command the exclusive allegiance of its subjects and
could not be restricted by any force external to it.83 Ignoring the details of
77

JANIS, supra note 35, at 164–66.
Id. at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 18
(Kelsey trans., 1925)).
79
JANIS, supra note 35, at 166–68.
80
Id. at 169–70.
81
Id. at 170.
82
See id. at 162 (“Hobbes’ lasting contribution was the envisioning, in his own words, of ‘that
great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the
Immortall God, our peace and defence.’ Rather than believing in any number of loyalties, Hobbes
believed that all men required ‘a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the
Common Benefit.’” (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Everyman’s Library ed. 1987))).
83
See JANIS, supra note 35, at 163 (explaining that Hobbes had asserted that “the key actor on the
world’s stage was the sovereign state to which all loyalty was due internally and which was
unrestrained externally”).
78
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the Westphalian Peace, and clearly breaking from medieval European
feudal structures, Hobbes demanded that the sovereign state exercise
plenary powers in a unitary form of government centered around a single
person, the absolute monarch.84 Because individuals came together in the
state of nature to form a government for the sole purpose of collective
security, a novel concept in Western political philosophy,85 any limitation
upon the power of the sovereign, external or internal, was for Hobbes an
unacceptable violation of the rights of the individuals who formed it.86
Hobbes’ impact upon Western thinking regarding the proper location
and extent of ultimate law-making power within a nation cannot be
overemphasized. In a very real sense, Hobbes’ writings were instrumental
in the way Western societies organized themselves for hundreds of years
following their publication, including up to today. Further, the particular
values and definitions of sovereignty Hobbes utilized in his works were so
influential and lasting because they came at a time when Europe was
moving from a feudal to a state-centered political system.87 Those values
also persisted because his political theories regarding the state of nature
and the social contract—central themes in Enlightenment-era philosophy—
inspired so many later thinkers, including Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu,
Jefferson, and even Kant and Mill.
Following Hobbes, the dominant philosophical stance on domestic
legal authority had decisively moved from multi-tiered, decentralized
organization among the entire civitas Christiana to unitary, absolutist
sovereign states. Yet this shift from the religious or natural law traditions
to positivist theory in Europe did not end with Hobbes. Jeremy
Bentham—the founder of utilitarianism who famously derided natural law
as “nonsense upon stilts”—also left his mark on the movement toward
legal positivism.88 Bentham’s contribution was to alter the understanding

84
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 139, 151–52 (John
Somerville & Ronald E. Santoni eds., 1963) (explaining that the state, as a “multitude so united in one
person, is called a commonwealth,” or “that great Leviathan,” and that “he that carrieth this person, is
called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his subject”).
85
That is, all medieval European notions of legitimate authority had been based on a delegation of
divine power, through the Church, to a secular authority. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying
text. For Hobbes, however, the state of nature represented the human condition prior to any political
organization of any kind, and as Hobbes envisioned such a condition to be a perpetual state of war,
humans were justified in extracting themselves from that condition by vesting their rights in a
sovereign for their mutual protection. The fact that Hobbes based the organizing motivation for
government on the needs and rights of individuals, apart from any divine delegation, was a truly
revolutionary shift in political theory and arguably marked the beginning of the Enlightenment. Kelly,
supra note 73, at 375.
86
Hobbes, supra note 84, at 151.
87
JANIS, supra note 35, at 162.
88
Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies L-6, available at http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~dss4/
bentham1.pdf. It is also worthy of note that in this same work—indeed, as an indispensable portion of
his argument—Bentham defines natural rights as those which pre-exist law but determines that rights
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of the law of nations, which had during the Middle Ages recognized some
protection for individuals incident to the laws of war and as members of a
Though his actions were perhaps
global Christian community.89
inadvertent, Bentham proposed in 1789 replacing “the law of nations” with
a new term, international law, which he defined in such a way as to
eliminate any inclusion of individuals as subjects of the discipline.90 In so
doing, Bentham distorted the traditional understanding of the positive laws
by which nations abided. Individuals, if they were to have any rights
whatsoever, could only obtain them at the behest of their own state; as
defined by Bentham, no person could ever claim protection in international
law against the actions of the sovereign government of which he or she
was a national.91
The philosophical shift in both domestic and international legal theory
from natural law to might-makes-right positivism was dramatic.92 Though
there were pockets of resistance to the change,93 a tide of positivist legal
theory washed into Western thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, relegating the protection of individuals and sub-national groups
to a derided discipline of “private” international law.94 Even the more
favored and respectable branch, “public” international law, which
concerned itself solely with the interactions of nation-states as Bentham
had proposed, was scorned by the English legal positivist John Austin, who
called it merely “positive morality” and not really a form of law at all.95
The political power and organization of Western civilization tracked,
and was influenced by, these positivist and absolutist notions of sovereign
cannot but be based upon law, and insofar as laws require a sovereign, i.e., must be positive laws, no
individual can be said to have any right without having it granted by the sovereign. Id. at L-5–6.
89
See Brand, supra note 2, at 1687–88 (“[In the Middle Ages, t]he ‘oneness’ of humanity was to
be found through the pervasive unity of God (jus divinum) in the Respublica Christiana. . . . [M]edieval
notions of sovereign power included limitations—based on abstract moral rights. Thus, there were
bounds beyond which the sovereign could not pass in its relations with the individual, and individual
rights which were not alienable to the sovereign.”) (footnotes omitted).
90
See JANIS, supra note 35, at 242–43 (describing how Bentham, in intending to replace the law
of nations with international law, “really went much further” primarily by assuming that “international
law was exclusively about the rights and obligations of states inter se and never about the rights and
obligations of individuals”); JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY 101 (2004) (explaining
that Bentham’s new term “‘[i]nternational law’ . . . was a law governing the mutual transactions
between sovereigns—a law that was entirely between nations, rather than reaching into their internal
affairs”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
See JANIS, supra note 35, at 244 (“Bentham excluded from the domain of his new subject all of
those rules in the traditional law of nations that concerned private rights and obligations.”).
92
See id. at 246 (“Regardless of its failings, Bentham’s definition of international law as a law for
states alone has had a potent effect. The states-only view of international law was generally adopted by
nineteenth-century legal positivists who went further than Bentham in elaborating the ramifications of
the definition.”).
93
See id. at 248 (“Despite the positivists’ philosophical rejection of individuals as subjects of
public international law, some parts of legal practice never entirely abandoned the more inclusive
doctrine of the traditional law of nations.”).
94
Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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states. With the influence of transcendental institutions in sharp decline,
European monarchs consolidated power into regimes of unquestioned
authority, and why not? Their actions had been sanctioned by the
seemingly progressive theories of the Enlightenment philosophers. Even
the popular democratic revolutions in the United States and France focused
on shifting the locus of sovereign power from the person of the monarch to
the people, summarized by the expression “popular sovereignty.”
However, despite the democratic attempt to empower the citizens directly
with civil and political rights, neither revolution sought to abandon the
positivist view. If anything, the struggle for democratic self-government in
those nations reinforced the idea of internal self-governance without
admitting the possibility of outside interference in the operation of the new
sovereign government.96
As legal positivism became orthodoxy in the nineteenth and into the
early twentieth century,97 absolutist, Hobbesian-style sovereignty became
more commonplace in legal and political fact.98 Unlike medieval Europe,
where groups oppressed by a local lord or monarch could conceivably
bring their grievances to the attention of the pope or emperor, no such
avenue of redress was available at all, particularly following the
dissolution of the Empire in 1806. A significant catalyst in solidifying the
notion of the absolute sovereignty of European nation-states was the
attempt by imperial France under Napoleon Bonaparte to gain control of
all of Europe.99 Following the bloody and turbulent Napoleonic Wars,
during which the le petit caporal attempted to establish France as the
dominant power on the continent, old European dynasties consolidated
power under the guise of attempts to banish such interference and warfare.
The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 was the foremost vehicle for
that purpose, concluded primarily between England, Russia, France,
96
The United States, as a new nation and a comparatively weak power on the world stage, made
significant strides toward joining the new and independent nation-states of Europe through its
recognition as a sovereign nation by Great Britain in 1789 and the implementation of the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823. See Preece, supra note 2, at 234–35 (“The independence of the United States added
it to the Eurocentric world of nation-states, especially once the other American states gained their
independence. This process was greatly facilitated by the enunciation by President Monroe of the
Monroe Doctrine, in 1823, as the fundamental principle of United States foreign policy.”). This was
also effectively the method by which the nation-states system spread to the newly independent Latin
American nations. Id. at 235.
97
See JANIS, supra note 35, at 246 (“For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
positivist definition of public international law as a law for states alone dominated the theory of
international law.”).
98
See Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Toward a Confucian Multicultural Approach to a Liberal World
Order: Insights from Historical East Asia, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 413, 413 (2005) (“In the socalled Age of Reason, sovereignty was understood as a principle that permitted state rulers to do
anything in their own self-interest. It was fair game for the strong to encroach on the weak. In the
eighteenth century, Prussia, Russia, and Austria carved up Poland.”).
99
See id. (listing imperial France’s attempts to conquer Europe as an extension of French
sovereign power); Preece, supra note 2, at 231.

1762

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: 1741

Austria and Prussia. That covenant embodied—or at least assumed—the
principles of autonomous and exclusive nation-states, a concept which had
been on the rise since the Middle Ages.100 As a marked departure from the
medieval approach of mediating authorities such as the Holy Roman
Empire or the Catholic Church, the Congress laid the groundwork for a
supposedly stable system of balanced alliances exclusively between the socalled Great Powers.101 However, the attempts by the Great Powers to
restore those pre-revolutionary dynasties by expanding their territories led
to the inclusion of large ethnic minorities—German, Greek, Italian,
Serbian and Polish, among others—within their borders. Without any
outlet for their grievances, the minorities’ demands for representation
turned into nationalistic revolutions, though most were successfully
suppressed through the joint military efforts of the Great Powers.102 While
the Congress certainly re-ordered the political map of Europe, the creation
of the German Confederation and the retention of a divided Italy left the
transition to a well-defined system of independent nation-states somewhat
incomplete.103 Italian and German (excluding Austria) unification under a
centralized government would not occur until approximately 1871,104
though there is no doubt that by this time the European Great Powers could
act unilaterally within their own territories without fear of reprisals,
coercion or condemnation by external powers, let alone legal constraints.
The concept of exclusive internal authority also suited the European
powers because many had established—or were still establishing—vast
colonial empires in Latin America, Africa and Asia.105 Knowing that the
native peoples in those lands often—but of course not always—lacked one
or more of the major attributes of “civilized” European nation-states such
as a distinct territory, centralized government or formal external relations,
it was easy for a European state to regard native peoples as having no legal
100
See Preece, supra note 2, at 231 (“At the Congress of Vienna, held from 1814–15, the
European leadership found no reason to question national sovereignty when drawing up the European
peace. Indeed, external sovereignty was developed further at the Congress . . . .”).
101
See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 73–74, 137–38 (1987)
(marking the rise of the Great Powers leading up to the Congress of Vienna and describing the evolving
European states system at the time as one “fashioned along lines which ensured a rough equilibrium”
and a “balance of power”).
102
See Hui, supra note 98, at 413 (“In the post-Napoleonic era, great powers in the Concert of
Europe used armies to put down revolutionary movements across Europe.”).
103
As to the exact legal and institutional details of the German Confederation, the multi-tiered
federal entity created by the Congress of Vienna was considerably complex. Suffice it to say, because
the fates of the thirty-nine small principalities in the Confederation were determined to a large extent
by Prussia and the Austrian Empire, this political body was clearly an aberration when compared to the
ideal of well-defined and independent nation-states envisioned by Westphalian orthodoxy. Though the
Holy Roman Empire had fallen in 1806, even the Congress of Vienna failed to establish even a de jure
Westphalian state system throughout Europe, nearly 150 years after the Peace which is said to have
done so.
104
Steiger, supra note 20, at 61.
105
Hui, supra note 98, at 413.
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rights which it, as a colonizing power, was bound to respect. In addition
to the economic incentives of colonization, the competitive pressures from
other European powers created a kind of arms race for exploiting local
peoples and resources.107 Certainly not eager to encourage or create
external institutions or legal processes that would scrutinize their
repressive colonial practices from a humanist or religious perspective, the
European states following the Congress largely turned away from
continental problems in favor of expanding their economic and military
capabilities. As those capabilities increased, and as colonial competition
intensified, the European powers organized themselves into an alliance
system, hoping to ward off future conflict through a balance-of-power
approach. Despite the obvious flaws of this model for international peace
and security,108 it took not one but two world wars and a genocide of
unprecedented scale to bring those defects to the sober attention of the
European nations.
B. False Historical Attribution of the Myth to Westphalia
Even though Europe has today entirely abandoned the system of
absolutely sovereign nation-states,109 the European influence on the
modern international system cannot be doubted.110 To the extent that the
European system of absolutist nation-states at some point resembled the
theory posited by Westphalian orthodoxy, the theory surely carries some
explanatory value, even if it simply fails to date accurately when the
change took place or how it occurred—two highly significant flaws. It is
possible to imagine that the state system could exist as it does today and
that something like Westphalian orthodoxy—call it “European
absolutism,” for instance—could be utilized to describe accurately that
portion of its evolution. Yet the legal and historical literature does not
speak of something like European absolutism; Westphalian orthodoxy
itself is the dominant model. So a question posed earlier still remains:
when and how did modern scholars and policy makers, nearly all of whom
seem to recite Westphalian orthodoxy as if it were unquestionably true,
106

Kelly, supra note 73, at 385–86.
Id. at 383.
108
See Hui, supra note 98, at 414 (noting the excessive death and destruction in Europe in the
centuries prior to the Cold War, rejecting the explanatory hypothesis that Europeans as a people are
“uniquely belligerent,” and instead comparing the high frequency of devastating warfare in Europe to
that of China between 656 and 221 BCE, when the Chinese system most resembled the early modern
European state-system and, not coincidentally, Sun Tzu wrote his famous work, The Art of War).
109
If anyone doubts this assessment, one need only take a close look at the history of the
European Union as a robust supranational system for economic and diplomatic cooperation, as well as
the functioning of the European Court of Human Rights, easily the most successful regional human
rights regime in the world.
110
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 73, at 391 (“As the creator of state sovereignty, Europe was also, in
fact, the chief exporter of the notion of state sovereignty to the rest of the world.”).
107
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come to believe that the Peace of Westphalia marked that kind of decisive
shift in the legal and political relations of Western powers?
To a certain extent, Westphalia may have historical appeal because
certain aspects of the treaties relate to the recognition of European nations
and others pertain to the semi-constitutional relationship between the
Empire and the German monarchs.111 In addition, as has been noted
previously, the Peace did mark one event in a progressive series from
decentralized power to absolutist nation-states,112 though the latter
probably reached its zenith sometime in the late nineteenth or first half of
the twentieth century. It is undoubtedly tempting for a proponent to state
unequivocally the origin of a complex historical and legal process,
particularly in light of the fact that such processes often overlap and to
delineate stark paradigm shifts is to simplify otherwise immensely
complex systems.113 Furthermore, when the proponent has taken it upon
himself or herself not only to describe but to defend the present system, the
temptation to enhance its legitimacy by ante-dating a definitive point of
origin may be irresistible.
An oft-cited work of scholarship on the meaning of Westphalia
appears to have provided the proponents of the myth with an intellectual
starting point, even though the original author was far more equivocal in
his assessment than its proponents turned out to be. In 1948, with the
tercentenary of the Peace approaching, Leo Gross published an article
examining the significance of Westphalia in the development of the
modern state system.114 In that work, Gross noted a common thread
running between the Peace and later international instruments such as the
League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations, namely those
provisions calling for the protection of individual rights and the prohibition
of discrimination against minorities.115 Gross also emphasized the novelty
of the Peace treaties’ terms for multilateral pacific settlement of disputes
and that, though Westphalia helped in replacing the transcendental
authorities and “divorcing [international law] from any particular religious
background . . . [i]t would seem hazardous, however, to regard the
Settlement of Westphalia and the work of Grotius as more than stages in
the gradual, though by no means uniform, process which antedates and
continues beyond the year 1648.”116 As to drawing conclusions, Gross also
explicitly warned that his own arguments were “necessarily tentative and
111

Beaulac, supra note 5, at 166–68.
See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 175–76 (discussing the tendency for historians to “ante-date the
beginning of pivotal phenomena such as state sovereignty” for that reason).
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See Gross, supra note 2, at 21 (“In view of this continued influence of the Peace of
Westphalia, it may not be amiss to discuss briefly its character, background and implications.”).
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Id. at 22–24.
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Id. at 25–27 (emphasis added).
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intended to indicate rather than to solve the problems connected with the
rise of the modern state system and the particular role of the Peace of
Westphalia in this vital process.”117
Later scholarship on the topic would not share Gross’s original
cautious assessment.118 Instead, much attention was paid to several nowfamous passages that suggested Gross had conclusively determined
Westphalia to be the definitive origin of the modern system of absolutely
sovereign and independent nation-states.119 In promoting this narrow and
distorted account of history, Gross’s contemporaries and those who were to
follow could justify their opposition to mid-twentieth-century attempts to
establish legal mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights. That is to
say, Gross, perhaps inadvertently, provided such opponents with an
additional arrow in their quiver; not only was legal protection of
international human rights a bad idea generally, it was antithetical to the
fundamental principles of the modern sovereign state system that had
existed for three hundred years.120 Unfortunately, as should become clear
shortly, the latter basis, descriptive but inaccurate, has come to replace
genuine normative debate over the optimal balance between domestic
power and human rights enforcement.
IV. THE MYTH’S IMPACT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
Regardless of the extent to which scholars of law and international
relations later (mis)used Gross’s writing, the national sovereignty’s myth
played a critical role in retarding the progress of human rights enforcement
following the Second World War.121 In this Part, for purposes of
foundation, I shall briefly describe the historical and political background
that led up to the formation of the United Nations system. From that
117

Id. at 30.
See, e.g., Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6
HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 271–72 & n.15 (1978) (labeling Gross’s conception of the era of the Peace an
“accurate[] characteriz[ation] as the beginning of a new world order”).
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Two particular passages have been especially prominent: “The Peace of Westphalia, for better
or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which
leads from the old into the new world.” Gross, supra note 2, at 28. “In the political field [Westphalia]
marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new
system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory,
equal to one another, and free from any external earthly authority.” Id. at 28–29.
120
It is important to understand that Gross’s supposed attribution did not mark the starting point
of the myth’s influence, but rather it helped to solidify the link between the Peace of Westphalia in
history to the pre-existing belief, held by some, that absolute sovereignty was a kind of basic norm in
international affairs. The myth had force and effect in international law and political relations well
before it became conceptually anchored to Westphalia. For example, while a defendant at the
Nuremberg trials in 1945–1946, Hermann Goering defended the premeditated horror of the Holocaust
against his critics by declaring: “But that was our right! We were a sovereign State and that was
strictly our business.” PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
202–04 (2d ed. 2003).
121
Id. at 160.
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foundation, I shall review the effect of the Westphalian myth on two
related events of the immediate post-war era: the drafting and adoption of
Chapters I and VII of the UN Charter, and the conversion of an
international bill of rights into the Universal Declaration. Those events,
significantly altered by the rhetorical force implicit in the term sovereignty,
illustrate the crippling and lasting influence the Westphalian myth has on
legal progress for human rights.
During World War II, the Allied powers employed extensive rhetoric
of individual rights and social progress in order to convince nations to form
a coalition against the Axis, most centrally in the creation of the Atlantic
Charter.122 In particular, the Atlantic Charter pledged the Allied nations to
promoting self-government, economic and labor rights, human rights, and
a redesigned global legal order.123 As a result, many smaller nations and
activists believed that human rights and the protection of minorities would
take center stage in the new United Nations system.124 In fact, the Soviet
Union, the United States, and Great Britain seemed to reconfirm those
ambitions with the adoption of the Declaration of the United Nations on
the first day of January 1942, which stated that its signatories would adhere
to the principles in the Atlantic Charter.125 The leading diplomatic
representative for the United States, Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles, was instrumental in directing U.S. policy in favor of human rights
norms. When he was assigned to head the State Department’s Special
Subcommittee on International Organization, Welles recognized that the
post-war planners would face a crucial question: “How do we limit
sovereignty?”126
The first real opportunity for significant post-war planning came at the
Dumbarton Oaks conference in late summer and fall 1944. There, with
victory in Europe seemingly in hand, the four leading Allied powers—
Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—met to
decide the new course for the post-war international system. By that time,
Undersecretary Welles had resigned his post and had been replaced in his
advisory role to F.D.R. by the far more conservative Secretary of State
Cordell Hull. During the negotiations, China surprised the other three
Allied powers by openly expressing their willingness to “cede as much of
its sovereign power as may be required,” and they expected that Britain,
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See id. at 137–40, 154–55 (detailing the effects of the Atlantic Charter upon small nations,
oppressed peoples, and democratic movements).
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See id. at 138–39 (describing these portions of the Atlantic Charter).
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Id. at 139.
125
Id. at 140.
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Id. at 157–59 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Franklin Roosevelt Library, Sumner
Welles Papers, Box 189, P-IO, Document 3, untitled, 31 July 1942).
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the United States, and the Soviets would follow suit.
Understandably
fearing that placing too much emphasis on human rights would encourage
scrutiny of their own domestic practices, the Soviet Union, the United
States, and Great Britain all agreed that human rights language—let alone a
legal regime for enforcement—would be excluded from the new universal
organization.128 The Chinese proposal for granting the United Nations the
power to intervene into the internal affairs of member states was rejected
by the other three Allied powers outright.129 One alternative the United
States delegation suggested would have included two Charter provisions,
one obligating the member states to respect human rights in their domestic
legal systems and another empowering the United Nations to investigate
allegations that a member state had failed in these obligations, but the
Soviet Union and Great Britain blocked that initiative as well.130 By
October, when the Dumbarton Oaks conference ended, no provision for
United Nations enforcement of human rights of any kind could be found
within the agreement. In fact, six months later, in April 1945, at the
commencement of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, the four leading Allied powers—now
referred to as the Four Sponsoring governments—proposed a series of
amendments to their Dumbarton Oaks framework, including a new
paragraph to be found in Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter:
Nothing contained in this Charter shall authorize the
Organization to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned or
shall require the members to submit such matters to
settlement under this Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, Section B.131
In order to understand the significance of the Four Sponsoring
governments’ Chapter I, Article 2 proposal, a review of the UN Charter’s
provisions for enforcement under Chapter VII is essential. Meeting in
separate conference delegations that paralleled the final structure of the
Charter, the representatives to the San Francisco conference in
Commission III decided to vest responsibility for peace and security
actions in the Security Council, operating under the assumption that any
127

Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.V. Soong, speech of 9 June 1942, in
Document 26831-11, “Public Statements by Chinese Leaders on International Organization,” from the
British Foreign Office in NANZ, EA 2, 1945/6b, File 111/8/8(1)).
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LAUREN, supra note 120, at 162–63.
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Id.
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Id. at 163.
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UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Amendments Proposed by the Governments of the United States,
The United Kingdom, The Soviet Union and China, in 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, at 622, 623 (1945)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO].
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such measures required the unanimous approval of the great power nations.
In the first instance, Article 39 of the Charter was written to give the
Security Council the exclusive authority to determine what actions
constitute a breach or threat to peace,132 and for instances in which military
forces are required, such forces were to be provided by the member states,
held “immediately available” for the Security Council’s command.133
Short of the deployment of forces, Chapter VI of the Charter permitted
referrals of disputes to the Security Council and authorized the Council to
investigate such disputes and to recommend procedures for pacific
settlement.134 However—and this point is crucial to understanding the
meaning of the United Nations’ enforcement powers—there is no
provision in the Charter which obligates or even authorizes the
organization to intervene in the event of widespread or systemic human
rights atrocities committed by a state against its citizens.135
The delegates to Commission I at the San Francisco conference
understood these Chapter VII enforcement powers because Commission III
had already accepted the basic structure initially proposed at Dumbarton
Oaks.136 Commission I was assigned the task of considering amendments
to the first two chapters of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, or what would
eventually become the UN Charter’s preamble, Chapter I: Purposes and
Principles and Chapter II: Membership.
The Four Sponsoring
governments’ amendment to Chapter I, Article 2 was eventually to become
Article 2(7) of Chapter I of the Charter, or what is known commonly as the
“domestic jurisdiction clause.”
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter shed light on the origin of
that clause, and some inferences may be drawn as to the rhetoric used and
values to which the delegates appealed in their debates, though the
documents themselves are largely limited to minutes taken from meetings
and unfortunately do not include verbatim transcripts of the delegates’
exchanges. Commission I representatives had the Dumbarton Oaks
framework at hand, which provided the basic structure for the new
organization. Debate over the preamble and Chapter I, purposes and
principles, was delegated to Committee 1 of Commission I, and a good
132

U.N. Charter art. 39.
Id. art. 43, para. 1; Id. art. 45. Critical to the understanding of the function of the Security
Council, of course, is that each of the five permanent members have a veto power, resulting in an utter
inability for the Security Council to take any action with which one of the permanent members
disagrees. Id. art. 27.
134
Id. arts. 33–38.
135
Presumably, the Security Council could enact coercive measures through its Chapter VII
authority, though such actions are incumbent upon a finding, under article 39, of a threat to peace,
breach of peace or act of aggression which jeopardizes international peace and security. See infra Part
V.B.
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UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Supplement to Report of Rapporteur, Committee I/1, to
Commission I (Doc. 944, I/1/34 (1), June 13) Chapter II, Article 8, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO,
supra note 131, at 486, 487–88.
133

2009]

LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM

1769

deal of its work in May and early June 1945 consisted of considering and
approving small proposed amendments to those three sections.137
However, even though the drafting subcommittee of Committee 1 had
produced complete drafts of those sections by June 9, 1945, the Four
Sponsoring governments’ Chapter I, Article 2 proposal was left for
exclusive consideration later in the committee’s agenda.138
In one of the travaux’s few documents opposing the amendments
offered by the Four Sponsoring governments, Norway’s representative, Dr.
Arnold Raestad, objected that the domestic jurisdiction clause would
impose “a very grave limitation” on the Security Council’s ability to
mediate peaceful settlements.139 In its view, the member states in nearly
any such dispute could assert that the necessary concessions were within
their domestic jurisdiction and were thus beyond the United Nations’
competence.140 The Norwegian delegation noted that even the Council of
the League of Nations was authorized to offer conciliation for domestic
conflicts, and it suggested that the United Nations’ efforts for peace could
not be realized “without a certain willingness on the part of the member
states to recede from rigid concepts of national sovereignty.”141
On June 14, 1945, the Australian delegation put forth a memorandum
in support of a minor change to the amendment by the Four Sponsoring
governments, one which illustrates some of the rhetorical devices
employed in favor of the domestic jurisdiction clause.142 The Australian
memorandum was in almost full agreement with the Four Sponsoring
governments’ amendment, and it posed the question of whether the Charter
should contain a prohibition on the United Nations’ intervention into
matters of domestic jurisdiction.143 The answer to that question, the
Australian delegation argued, should be affirmative: “No [international]
organisation should be permitted to intervene in those domestic matters in
which, by definition, international law permits each state entire liberty of
action.”144 Further, in asserting its main point of contention—that the
Security Council could be used as a tool by stronger nations for extorting
137
See UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I,
in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, supra note 131, at 387, 387–401.
138
UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Appendix to Rapporteur’s Report, Committee I/1 (Doc. 885,
I/1/34, June 9, 1945): Approved Texts of Preamble, Chapter I, and Chapter II, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF
THE UNCIO, supra note 131, at 402, 402–04.
139
UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Statement by the Norwegian Delegation (Dr. Arnold Raestad)
on Paragraph 8, Chapter II: June 12, 1945, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, supra note 131, at 430,
430.
140
Id.
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Id. at 431–32.
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UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Amendment by the Australian Delegation to Proposed
Paragraph 8 of Chapter II (Principles): Memorandum by Dr. H. V. Evatt on Behalf of the Australian
Delegation, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, supra note 131, at 436, 436.
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concessions from less powerful ones—the Australian memorandum
implicitly revealed its authors’ hidden assumptions about sovereignty:
The freedom of action which international law has
always recognised in matters of domestic jurisdiction [ought
not to become subject] to the full jurisdiction of the Security
Council. . . . By definition, a state is free, within the limited
sphere of domestic jurisdiction, to adopt whatever policy it
thinks best.145
On the afternoon of June 14, 1945, Committee 1 met in the Veterans
Building in San Francisco to discuss the proposed amendment offered by
the Australian delegation.146 The majority of the discussion concerned
Australia’s proposal for the exception to the domestic jurisdiction clause;
only a few statements from various delegations addressed any alternative
to its substance. The delegate of China was the first to speak in opposition,
noting that in his view any limitation on the United Nations’ enforcement
powers could undermine the organization’s primary purpose of
maintaining peace and security, and he asserted that those powers ought
not to be “hampered” by the domestic jurisdiction clause.147 The delegate
from Great Britain spoke in support of the Australian delegation’s version
of the clause, explicitly recognizing that “certain states were jealous of
their rights of national jurisdiction” and arguing that the United Nations
could not interfere in the internal affairs of states “until and unless” a
dispute threatened to become a war.148 A representative of France
followed the British delegate, reminding the committee that his
government had originally proposed an amendment to the enforcement
powers chapter to allow UN intervention in cases where “the clear
violation of essential liberties and of human rights constitute[d] in itself a
threat capable of compromising peace.”149 That amendment, the French
delegate said, was in recognition of the historical experience of Nazism
and the Holocaust, which had illustrated the desirability of international
intervention for the purpose of protecting “certain unfortunate
minorities.”150 Shortly before the final roll call vote was taken, the
Norwegian delegate, reiterating his government’s earlier concerns,
expressed agreement with the delegates from China and France.151
Before the close of the June 14 afternoon meeting at 6 p.m., delegate
145

Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Summary Report of Sixteenth Meeting of Committee I/1,
Veterans Building, Room 303, June 13, 1945, 3:40 p.m., in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, supra note
131, at 494.
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Id. at 497.
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John Foster Dulles requested permission to speak on behalf of the domestic
jurisdiction clause.152 The committee reconvened at 8:30 the next evening,
and the chair called on Dulles to deliver his presentation in support of the
proposed amendment to Article 2 of Chapter I.153 Dulles first noted that
the Four Sponsoring governments had proposed the amendment to alter the
Dumbarton Oaks agreement in view of the “change in the character” of the
United Nations since the initiation of the San Francisco conference.154 The
expansion of the organization’s competence to economic and social
matters, he said, “constituted a great advance, but it also engendered
special problems.”155 Specifically, Dulles said, while the Economic and
Social Council—recently made a principal organ of the new
organization—was given a mandate to raise standards of living and foster
employment and other economic goals, the domestic jurisdiction clause
was written to ensure that no member of the Security Council would be
permitted to “go behind the governments in order to impose its desires.”156
Dulles opposed a proposal empowering the new International Court of
Justice to interpret when a matter was essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a member state, and he concluded by saying that future
generations would be grateful to the committee’s adoption of a simple,
absolute rule prohibiting interference in states’ domestic affairs.157 Three
days later, a report by Committee 1 of Commission I recorded the approval
of the Four Sponsoring governments’ amendment, explicitly
acknowledging that “[s]tated positively the [new] paragraph means: (1)
that each state has entire liberty of action in matters which are essentially
within its domestic jurisdiction . . . .”158
Dulles’s reference to the new organization’s “change in character”
between Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco was undoubtedly reflective of
the influence exerted by many nations and activists during the latter
conference, the first time anyone other than the elite corps of diplomats
from the Allied powers had a chance to express their preferences for the
new international system. Extensive lobbying by many individuals and
groups, all of whom having formed an expectation that the United Nations’
structure would conform to the cosmopolitan ideals of the stated Allied
objectives, had led to the inclusion of human rights clauses in the
152
Id. at 499. In fact, it was Dulles who had originally proposed the domestic jurisdiction
amendment at Dumbarton Oaks. CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 48 (2003).
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UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Summary Report of Seventeenth Meeting of Committee I/1,
Veterans Building, Room 303, June 14, 1945, 8:30 p.m., in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, supra note
131, at 507.
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Charter—most prominently in the preamble and the elevation of the
Economic and Social Council—as well as to the creation of the trusteeship
system and a commission to create an international bill of rights.159 Thus,
after months of negotiations, the UN Charter came to reflect both the new
norm of human rights as well as the traditional protection of internal
sovereignty,160 most conspicuously in the final version of its domestic
jurisdiction clause, Article 2(7),161 which was recognized even at the time
as “potentially the most substantial limitation that is to be found anywhere
in the whole Charter upon the activity of the United Nations.”162 In fact,
legal scholar Phillip C. Jessup had anticipated the ideological conflict
between sovereignty and human rights enforcement even before the San
Francisco conference began: “We have taught the layman to worship the
arch-fiction of the sovereign state,” he wrote, “and thereby have built a
Maginot line against the invasion of new ideas in the international
world.”163
The myth of sovereignty continued to exert its corrosive influence
when it came to fleshing out the decision to draft and adopt an
international bill of rights. During the drafting attempts led by the
Commission on Human Rights, a primary question was whether any
enumeration of such rights would be succeeded by a multilateral
convention creating binding legal obligations upon its signatories.164 A
major influence upon Eleanor Roosevelt—who chaired the commission—
during the implementation debates came from the Truman administration,
whose Democratic party had to rely on votes from representatives in the
Jim Crow-era South, many of whom insisted that any cessation of national
or state sovereignty in this way would be tantamount to introducing antilynching legislation and could “ultimately lead to the United Nations
investigating the condition of ‘negroes in Alabama.’”165 Roosevelt
159
LAUREN, supra note 120, at 188–90, 209; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE
NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10–18 (2001)
(explaining the expectations of small nations and colonized peoples with respect to the international
system and detailing their lobbying efforts).
160
GLENDON, supra note 159, at 18–19; Preece, supra note 2, at 230.
161
The final version of Article 2(7) reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 23 (2d rev.
ed. 1949).
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LAUREN, supra note 120, at 191–92 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillip Jessup,
as quoted in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, International Safeguard of Human
Rights, at 16).
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Assembly Delegation, October 28, 1946, US/A/M/(CHR)/10, Box 60, File “US/A/M/(CHR)/I-32,”
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received specific instructions from Durward Sandifer in the U.S. State
Department that discussions of legal enforcement of human rights
provisions “should be kept on a tentative level and should not involve any
commitments by [the U.S.] Government.”166
Great Britain and the Soviets had also lobbied since Dumbarton Oaks
for a non-binding declaration, or no declaration at all, for similar reasons
relating to their respective practices of operating a global colonial empire
and a murderous totalitarian regime.167 During those deliberations, the
Soviet representative warned against “cross[ing] the border which divides
international from internal law—the border which divides the interrelationships of governments from the field where the sovereign rights of
After much discussion, Roosevelt and
nations must prevail.”168
representatives from Great Britain and the Soviet Union persuaded their
fellow members from smaller nations that a binding convention would be
inappropriate and that the commission would work on a declaration only,
with a convention to follow later, adopted into law at the initiation of the
member governments.169 Ultimately, the document the commission
drafted, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was entirely
aspirational.
The failure of the United Nations system to include legal, military or
other coercive capabilities to prevent such atrocities was an indirect result
of the myth of Westphalia. The political force of the proponents of the
Westphalian myth had a perceptible influence on the outcome of events at
the founding of the United Nations system. Though it is not certain that
any San Francisco delegate ever explicitly invoked the term Westphalia,
debate over the domestic jurisdiction clause was premised upon the very
“definition” of international law as imposing no obligation on a state with
respect to its own citizens, a position clearly recalling Bentham’s
reinterpretation of the term.170 Moreover, just as the concept of “states’
rights” had been used by American southerners for over a century to justify
continued racial oppression, the great power nations used sovereignty as a
talisman to undercut the international bill of rights, converting it into a
Records of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Record Group 84; Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting
of the United States General Assembly Delegation, October 28, 1946, US/A/M/(CHR)/II, ibid.;
Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the General Assembly Delegation, November 12, 1946,
US/A/M/(CHR)/15, ibid.; Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Third
Regular Session of the General Assembly, October 5, 1948, US(P) A/M/(CHR)/10, Box 60, File
“US(P)/A/M/(CHR)/I-34,” ibid.). But see GLENDON, supra note 159, at 86 (taking a much more
favorable stance with respect to Roosevelt’s position on the plight of African Americans).
166
LAUREN, supra note 120, at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Memorandum
from Durward Sandifer to Eleanor Roosevelt (Feb. 5, 1947)).
167
GLENDON, supra note 159, at 84–85; LAUREN, supra note 120, at 163.
168
LAUREN, supra note 120, at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JOHN HUMPHREY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1984).
169
See GLENDON, supra note 159, at 84–87.
170
See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
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declaration of no legal force or effect.
It was clear, even to observers at the time, that only the less-powerful
nations—not so obsessed with protecting their new presumed status as
absolute sovereign states—were willing to accept that the idea of
sovereignty was merely one way of distributing legal authority and not the
only way; the most powerful nations could not be persuaded to consider
that possibility.171 From a strictly political perspective, this disparity of
power was a primary reason the myth took on its persuasive force in the
negotiations. Had the roles been reversed and the powerful nations had
argued for significant limitations on domestic powers in order to prevent
human rights abuses by less-powerful nations, any appeal the smaller
nations made to ethereal notions of “absolute sovereignty” would have
seemed like feeble cries of last resort by petty tyrants bent on retaining
their impunity to mistreat and murder their own citizens. But because an
international order that did not include Great Britain, the United States and
the Soviet Union was not politically feasible or practical, sovereignty
operated in the background as an assumed principle that had to be
overcome—when it was overcome at all—only with considerable effort.172
As such, a delegate’s appeal to sovereignty gave his or her argument the air
of force and historical legitimacy while concealing the real motivation, the
retention of political power. As a result, the less-powerful nations and
others inclined to promote human rights were forced to accept the Charter
in its present form, retaining a structure, function and series of limitations
for essentially domestic matters that shape the distribution of power—as
well as the ability for the United Nations to respond to human rights and
humanitarian crises—to the present day.
V. FAILINGS OF THE WESTPHALIAN MYTH: NON-INTERVENTION IN
BURMA
A. Overview of the Crisis and the International Response
The enduring inaccuracy of the traditional Westphalian story has
produced a multitude of consequences in the international legal and
political system, some immediate and some more remote.
As
demonstrated in the two previous Parts, the grounding of the current state
system’s legitimacy on questionable historical footing has produced a
nearly unexamined orthodoxy in the academy, as well as an early
codification of the internal sovereignty principle in the founding document
171
See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 159, at 85–86 (recounting the opinion of Charles Malik, the
representative to the Commission on Human Rights from Lebanon, that the debate over a declaration or
a legally binding convention was “a challenge between [the] small and great powers”) (quoting Human
Rights Commission, Second Session (E/CN.4/SR.28, pp. 11–12)).
172
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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of the world’s only universal political organization. As a result, instead of
governments, activists and theorists asking themselves how best to
promote and protect human rights as a first-order priority, the inquiry has
become: How can one secure marginal human rights progress without
disturbing the seemingly indispensable foundation of the entire edifice?
This constraint retards efforts that would otherwise result in improved
human rights treatment and prosperity for literally billions of individuals
on the planet. Amazingly enough, this breaking effect even persists in the
face of acute crisis, when peoples—hopelessly out-matched—are forced to
confront oppression, illness or mass violence with little or no help from the
industrialized portion of humanity. Recent events in a segregated and
terrorized segment of Asia will serve to illustrate the obstructions the
Westphalian mythology poses to human rights and humanitarian concerns.
But first, a review of those recent events would be beneficial.
The largest nation-state in Southeast Asia by territory is Burma,
officially known by its government as the Union of Myanmar.173 The
country holds rich mineral reserves as well as significant offshore oil and
gas deposits.174 It is a member of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (“ASEAN”),175 and though the military-controlled economy
includes revenues from those natural resources, illegal narcotics and some
foreign investment, because of corruption and poor management, Burma
remains one of the poorest nations in Asia with respect to per capita
income.176 In addition to the majority Burman people, the country contains
several ethnic minority populations, though in terms of spiritual culture,
nearly the entire nation practices Buddhism.177 All news media are strictly
controlled by the government.178
Burma is a former colony of Great Britain that gained its independence
in 1948 and had a democratic government until 1962, when General Ne
Win seized power in a coup.179 That military regime controlled the nation
until a currency devaluation triggered a widespread pro-democracy
173
B.B.C. News, Country Profile: Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_
profiles/1300003.stm [hereinafter Country Profile] (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). There is considerable
debate, at least in the United Kingdom, as to whether the country is properly called Burma or
Myanmar. See, e.g., B.B.C. News, Should it be Burma or Myanmar?, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7013943.stm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) (explaining that the ruling junta
changed the official name in 1989 following an unsuccessful popular uprising and that the B.B.C.
refers to it as Burma for the familiarity of its readers). Simply out of respect for the activists still
attempting to liberate the people and reignite the former democracy, references to the nation follow the
former naming convention.
174
Country Profile, supra note 173.
175
B.B.C. News, Q&A: Protests in Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7010202.stm
[hereinafter Protest Q&A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
176
Country Profile, supra note 173.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
B.B.C. News, Obituary: Ne Win, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1581413.stm (last
visited May 15, 2009).
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movement in 1987–88 that destroyed the savings of many Burmese
citizens.180 A national uprising, consisting of hundreds of thousands of
anti-government protesters, occurred on August 8, 1988, but that
movement was brutally suppressed by the military, killing at least 3,000
persons in the process.181 The first multi-party election in thirty years was
held in 1990, and Nobel laureate Dr. Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the
National League for Democracy (“NLD”), won a huge parliamentary
majority.182 However, General Saw Maung—who had seized power in a
1988 coup—never permitted the NLD or any other civilian parties to
govern according to any free election. General Maung was succeeded in
1992 by Senior General Than Shwe, who currently is chairperson of the
State Peace and Development Council (“SPDC”), the twelve-member band
of senior generals that leads the military regime.183 The 75-year-old
General Shwe has consistently refused to transfer power or even to make
marginal democratic reforms. Moreover, in 2004, he sacked a moderate
member of his own junta, former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, for allegedly
supporting reconciliation talks with the NLD and Dr. Aung San Suu Kyi,
who was originally put under house arrest in 1990 and remains so to this
day.184
Due to its spiritual influences, the Burmese monks are the Buddhist
nation’s most respected faction and serve as leaders in communities.185
The monasteries offer free education even to those citizens who do not
ultimately become monks.186 In addition to simple religious or ceremonial
services, the monks dole out a kind of spiritual credit to those who provide
various handouts, as the monks are not permitted to accept donations of or
even handle money.187 A monk’s most potent admonition comes when he
refuses to accept a handout, a signal that the donor has been denied the
opportunity to earn the coveted spiritual credit.188 Such denials are not the
only form of censure displayed by the Burmese monks; they have a long
history of activism against unpopular or immoral actions by a governing
authority, including conducting protests against the British colonial
occupation in the 1930s.189 The monks’ protest role relates to their former
function as intermediaries between the people and the Burmese monarchy
180

Protest Q&A, supra note 175.
Id.
Country Profile, supra note 173.
183
Id.
184
Id.; Kate McGeown, B.B.C. News, What Burma Wants from the World,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7033911.stm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
185
Sarah Buckley, B.B.C. News, Who are Burma’s Monks?, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7014173.stm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
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182
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through the late nineteenth century. Monks are said to command
considerable moral authority, even among the military, and can encourage
many other Burmese to join a protest march if they rise in support of it.190
Already facing extreme conditions of poverty from the corruption in
the government, the regime’s decision on August 15, 2007 to increase the
price of fuel hit the Burmese people hard.191 Essential commodities such
as rice and cooking oil also rose, sparking a 400-person protest by prodemocracy activists on August 19.192 Though that initial march was
quickly dispelled by the military, protests around the nation continued,
particularly after a significant number of Burmese monks joined on
September 5.193 The following day, monks took several government
officials hostage and publicly demanded that the regime apologize to the
people by September 17.194 When the deadline passed, tens of thousands
of monks began daily protests in earnest and withdrew religious services
from the military and their families.195 On September 21, an organizing
group called the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks came forth to
coordinate the protests and issued public statements declaring the regime
an “enemy of the people” and that protests would continue until they had
“wiped the military dictatorship from the land.”196 The monks were joined
in the largest protests—in the city of Rangoon and elsewhere—by top
members of the NLD, small ethnic groups, and ordinary Burmese citizens,
and one rally linked the protests to Burma’s pro-democracy movement by
marching past the house of Aung San Suu Kyi.197
Apart from the arrests made during the 400-person march on August
19, the military leadership took no action during the first week of largescale protests.198 Then, on September 25, the military issued a warning
that action would be taken if the protests did not cease, and the next day it
imposed a total daylight curfew by introducing hundreds of troops and riot
police into the streets.199 Clashes between the military and the protestors
erupted immediately, and by September 27, the junta acknowledged killing
nine people, though other observers noted that the count was probably far

190
See id. (relating the history of the monks’ political role and explaining why their refusal to
accept handouts from the military was such a powerful statement in the recent protests).
191
Protest Q&A, supra note 175.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
Id.; Kate McGeown, B.B.C. News, Burma: Your Questions Answered, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/7041203.stm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
198
Protest Q&A, supra note 175; see also Mydans, supra note 29 (reporting a 10,000-strong
protest by monks in Rangoon and noting that the junta had been allowing free reign to the monks for
fear of a public backlash if they were to crack down).
199
Protest Q&A, supra note 175.
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higher.
The junta made thousands of arrests in the days following,
rounding up monks to be held in makeshift detention centers before being
transported north to prison camps, where many monks remain.201 News
reporters stationed in and around Burma also reported rumors that the
military was using a Rangoon crematorium to perform night-time
incinerations of the bodies of protestors killed as a result of the
crackdown.202 A B.B.C. reporter who witnessed the events, attempting to
estimate the loss of life, admitted, “[t]he truth is that we may never know
exactly how many people died and were detained.”203
In a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, special
rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro was also informed of the acts of
incineration in the Rangoon crematorium as part of a five-day visit to
Burma in the wake of the protests, though he was prevented from visiting
the incineration site.204 Pinheiro confirmed the deaths of thirty-one
persons, listed seventy-four missing persons and reiterated stories of
soldiers driving amidst crowds of protestors, firing live ammunition and,
on two occasions, fatally shooting young boys in cold blood.205 The report
also contained information about large-capacity detention centers lacking
sanitation, guarded by dogs and holding children, monks and pregnant
women who were alternatively confined and tortured.206 Pinheiro’s report
was part of the Security Council’s demand for an investigation into the
incidents, and it called for a “genuine dialogue” between the junta and the
pro-democracy elements as well as the release of political prisoners.207 A
statement by the Security Council expressed “regret[] [at] the slow rate of
progress” toward those goals, and UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari was in the
process of negotiating another visit sometime before mid-April 2008,
though the Burmese leadership stated that any time earlier than that would
not be convenient.208
In terms of national and regional responses, the United States and the
European Union enacted limited sanctions, though taken individually
neither power carries much weight with the Burmese military regime.209
Initially, the ASEAN strongly condemned the junta’s violent repression of
200

Id.
Id.
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McGeown, supra note 197.
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Warren Hoge, U.N. Myanmar Report Cites New Arrests and Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2007, at A10, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
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B.B.C. News, UN Raps Burma’s ‘Slow Progress’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7195313.stm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
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Id. Gambari, a UN special envoy, returned from Burma near the beginning of October 2007
after having spoken with senior military officials and Aung San Suu Kyi. Protest Q&A, supra note
175.
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the protests, but by early December 2007, the organization had backed
off its original stance and ignored the requests by the United States and
European Union for diplomatic isolation and an economic embargo.211
China, seen as Burma’s closest strong-power ally in Asia, also publicly
called on the regime to put a stop to the violence, but as B.B.C. News
noted, China “has maintained its traditional reluctance to interfere in the
domestic affairs of other countries.”212 India and Russia—the other
regional powers with influence over the regime—apparently have adopted
China’s posture.213
B. Westphalian Orthodoxy’s Influence on Intervention in Burma
The persistence of the myth of Westphalia helps to perpetuate the
autocratic Burmese junta and their gross violations of human rights. This
it does in several ways—systemically, institutionally and psychologically.
The political history of the United Nations system demonstrates the way in
which the Great Powers enshrined the exclusivity principle of sovereignty
into the organization’s charter, limiting its enforcement powers to actions
With the
that threaten only international peace and security.214
gravitational distribution of global power centered almost solely at the
level of the nation-state, and with the understanding that something like
Westphalian state sovereignty still persists to protect states from legal
sanctions over internal matters, states pursue domestic policies that
undermine their moral and political authority on matters of humanitarian
concern. Finally, the psychological force of national sovereignty—
supposedly given descriptive credibility by questionable references to
European history—tends to smother frank discussions of diplomacy by
falsely presenting exclusive and absolute sovereignty as a desirable feature
in international law.
At the broadest level, the United Nations system was unable to prevent
the brutal repression of the recent democratic protests in Burma, or to exert
any kind of real pressure to bring down the ruling junta, largely because it
was not designed to do so. In the first instance, the UN Charter prohibits
states from using force or the threat of force against other states unless in
210

Id.
Seth Mydans, As Spotlight on Myanmar Fades, Generals Breathe Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2007, at A10, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. In an analysis for the Times, Mydans
noted the strong position the ASEAN took shortly after smuggled photographs and video of the protest
crackdown were shown worldwide but that, by early December, the ASEAN had ignored opportunities
to pressure the regime and to accept a visit from UN envoy Gambari. Id. “We don’t want to come
across as being too confrontational in a situation like this,” ASEAN secretary-general, Ong Keng Yong,
said. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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self-defense or, in practice, authorized in advance by the United Nations.215
Thus, enforcement actions on humanitarian matters that do not threaten
another member state are relegated to the purview of the Security Council
through its Chapter VII powers.216 However, two broad provisos have
historically limited the council’s discretion in such matters: the need to
show a threat to international peace and security,217 and the necessity of
securing the offending state’s consent before engaging peacekeeping
troops into its territory.218 Both limitations can be seen as indirect effects
of the myth of exclusive and absolute sovereignty; the first concerns the
proper role of the United Nations as determined by its founders—
particularly the Great Powers—and the second clearly speaks to the
persistent concerns of what types of situations are matters of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction.219
There is no doubt that the protests in August and September of 2007
related most directly to the internal organization and operation of the
Burmese people’s government. As such, the protests and their suppression
probably did not threaten Burma’s neighbors directly, and thus no other
state could reasonably claim self-defense as a justification for intervention.
By the same token, even an active Security Council would have difficulty
making the case that the situation in Burma directly threatened
international peace and security, though it has occasionally relaxed this
rule for responses to humanitarian crises, such as in Southern Rhodesia,
South Africa, Somalia and Haiti.220 However, the Security Council was
not active in this case. As with a host of international human rights
challenges, the Security Council has delegated the matter to a charter
organ, the Human Rights Council, which concerns itself with fact-finding
and diplomacy and clearly has no capacity to force an end to the military’s
violent oppression, detention and murder of its citizens.221 The fact that
such delegations are made, even in times of acute humanitarian crisis, is
215

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. art. 51.
Id. arts. 39, 42.
217
BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 151–52 (2002).
218
Id. at 180–82. The author enumerates a few examples where the Security Council has found
exceptions to the consent requirement, a constraint on UN action informed by Article 2(7)’s prohibition
on intervention into the domestic affairs of states and proscription of the ability to require members to
submit matters to settlement, as well as Chapter VI’s explicit recognition of the consent requirement.
Id. at 180, 182–83. However, despite these few exceptions, the list of instances where the council
could have but failed to intervene without the ruling authority’s consent—including in Burma—is
probably much longer.
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See id. at 180 (explaining that, since the first armed peacekeeping mission, “the consent of the
states involved has been a linchpin of U.N. peacekeeping practice”).
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Id. at 152–54.
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Such capacity has been recognized as indispensable to bring democracy back to Burma. See
McGeown, supra note 197 (explaining that, while the author and others were encouraged that the
participation of the Burmese monks could bring about regime change, her colleagues warned her that,
“no matter how much the monks were encouraged both at home and abroad, they could never
overthrow the 400,000-strong military—one of the strongest in the region”).
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itself a sign of the systemic results of a wildly erroneous belief in the
propriety of exclusive domestic jurisdiction over such matters. It is
therefore no wonder that telephone and other calls from the Burmese
people to the United Nations during the brutal military response fell on
deaf ears.222
Relating to the distribution of authority—or lack thereof—at the
international level, there is the fact that nation-states have responded, as
the recipients of the vast majority of global political power, by pursuing
domestic policies that weaken their ability to pressure other nations on
human rights and humanitarian issues.
By continuing to follow
unwaveringly the norm of national sovereignty—implicitly through their
actions or, on occasion, explicitly through public statements—nation-states
can assume a kind of impunity with respect to domestic policies, partially
because they know there is almost never any higher legal institution
authorized to restrict such action.223 The Bush administration in the United
States, though admittedly one of the most vocal in calling for some kind of
political and economic sanctions against the Burmese military government,
suffered the effects of such policies by seeing its moral and political capital
More importantly,
depleted through various domestic activities.224
however, the frequent use of national sovereignty as a defense for domestic
policies converts the descriptive accuracy of the concept into a normative
principle, one that is identified with institutional or national behavior.
Thus, attempts to appeal to other norms—such as humanitarian or
democratic interests—subsequent to the repeated invocations of
sovereignty are derided as hypocritical by the actor making the appeals.225
This increased probability of being regarded as insincere in one’s
222
See McGeown, supra note 184 (“While they might not favour sanctions, the people of Burma
definitely want the international community’s help in other ways. Many of those who telephoned the
UN during the crackdown asked why no-one was sending a peacekeeping force. . . . ‘The international
community did nothing to stop a three-day killing spree,’ one woman said. ‘That was when I realised
we were on our own.’”).
223
Of course, not all nation-states act with such impunity, and others who might be inclined to do
so can sometimes be persuaded by recourse to certain types of political, economic or moral coercion,
the varying effectiveness of which I will not attempt to address here. Suffice it to say that the
assurances of national sovereignty provide states with substantial legal cover, and they are particularly
likely to embolden governments that are not responsive to such non-legal forms of condemnation.
224
See Mydans, supra note 211 (“In what seems to be a sign of the United States’ waning
influence in the region, China, India and Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbors have brushed aside
Washington’s calls for an economic embargo and the diplomatic isolation of the junta.”).
225
China, for instance, has issued counter-attacks in its state-run media to reports by the United
States detailing Chinese human rights abuses. See, e.g., US Human Rights Hypocrisy Attacked, CHINA
DAILY, May 22, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHIDLY File. Such counter-attacks have
included condemnations against the United States’ treatment of Iraqi prisoners and have stated that
U.S. actions “have prompted China to suspend its human rights dialogue with the United States.” Id.
Interestingly, the same report from the China Daily also contains the following statement, supposedly
made by Dong Yunhu, the Vice President of the China Society for Human Rights Studies: “The United
States should stop interfering in other countries’ internal affairs by using human rights, and return to an
equal dialogue on human rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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international affairs leads nation-states such as China never to invoke
humanitarian interests and to concern itself solely with protecting its image
as a defender of nationalism and, concurrently, with reaping the benefits of
doing so.226
Perhaps the most potent effects of the myth of Westphalia are
psychological in nature, as it distorts every discussion about whether
humanitarian intervention in Burma was or is appropriate.
The
consequences of the myth are therefore registered all the way up through
national policy, institutional capacity and, ultimately, to the basic structure
of the international system. Even in the case of a totally failed and
illegitimate government such as Burma, the presumption in international
law and diplomacy is that the state is recognized as still entitled to the
privileges of even the most just democracies. Of course, under the United
Nations system, a government can forfeit such privileges if it becomes a
threat to international peace and security, but absent that extreme
circumstance, the ruling domestic authority is protected by its inherent
sovereign rights.227 Such was the case with Burma, where the international
community gave a large outcry against the military crackdown but no legal
sanction or tactical support of any kind followed as a result.228 Insofar as
decision-makers are aware that the concept of sovereignty informs and
pervades every aspect of international affairs, any desire to intervene on
behalf of internal popular uprisings must climb the conceptual hill of
justification, made needlessly steeper by reference to an inaccurate account
of the historical origins—and hence legitimacy—of the international state
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The appalling plight of the people of Burma remains just one in a long
line of perfectly remediable yet unaddressed conditions throughout the
developing world, tolerated by humankind and rationalized by myopic
notions of the traditional or proper place of international law. While
certainly there is no single cause for the sustained patience the
international community shows to the few remaining totalitarian
governments on the planet, the extent to which the falsehood of Westphalia
226

See McGeown, supra note 197 (“India and China, as Burma’s main trading partners, have
come under a lot of pressure from the international community to take firm action against Burma. But
people I met on the ground did not seem to have much faith in either nation to have a positive influence
on the ruling generals. One woman we spoke to said she thought China wasn’t interested in helping
ordinary Burmese people—a view that was reinforced when she noticed that the soldiers who took part
in the crackdown were brought into Rangoon in Chinese-made trucks.”).
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See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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See Mydans, supra note 211 (reporting in early December: “The streets are quiet in Myanmar.
The ‘destructive elements’ are in jail. The international outcry has faded. The junta’s grip on power
seems firm.”).
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plays into that patience is the degree of speed with which legal and
historical scholarship must correct its error. This humble work, far from
making any claim to bringing about actual change, seeks only to illustrate
the link between an erroneous historical orthodoxy and the present
suffering of real people.
In addition to intervention issues, the fact that strong or even absolute
notions of sovereignty—which persist among theorists and policy
makers—obstructs the progression of human rights generally is probably
not in dispute. One of the most troubling consequences of the continued
belief in the myth of Westphalia is how it has changed the rhetoric and
decision-making process when discussing critical human rights issues in
classrooms, political debates and foreign ministers’ offices. To a certain
degree, for those who believe the status quo has a certain normative
legitimacy because “things are the way they are for a reason,” the
descriptive inaccuracy of Westphalia poses enormous obstacles to
challenging the status quo of the present state system. Many political and
legal theorists, particularly in international relations, it seems, suffer from
an inexcusable deficiency of imagination when it comes to evaluating the
wisdom of the current system as a whole. When the specter of a threat to
sovereignty is made as ground for opposition to a humanitarian cause, the
image conjured in the mind of a Western scholar or policy maker may be
that of challenging the very foundation upon which international law and
society are based. One might expect the natural response to be, yes, the
notion of absolute sovereignty is being challenged, and that is at least a
plausible starting point for the debate. Instead, all too often the discussion
is closed, as preserving sovereignty is seen as an end in itself. Unwavering
faith in the accuracy of the Westphalian mythology, unsurprisingly,
provides no assistance for resolving these limitations.

